Preparing for Peace
The website of the Westmorland General Meeting 'Preparing for Peace' initiative
The minds of leaders: de-linking war and violence
Dr Christopher Williams
(United Nations University Leadership Academy)
Lee Yun Joo
(University of London – School of Oriental and African Studies)
War is made in the minds of men, concluded the founders of the UN. But it is made in the minds of particular ‘men’ – those who are leaders. If the idea of war as a political force is to change, the minds of those with power must change. We cannot make war totally unthinkable. It has been invented, so it will always be thinkable. But how is it is possible to create a context in which war is unthinkable because it is not perceived as a feasible, rational or legitimate political act by those with power?
The first part of this paper outlines familiar understandings of the evolutionary/biological drivers of violence and aggression, but also the argument that this alone does not create war. It then establishes that war is made by leaders. Despite this, leadership theory has been ignored, yet straightforward conceptual frameworks are relevant and applicable. The discussion then identifies contexts in which war seems to have been made less thinkable. Regionalisation is central, but there are other aspects: cosmopolitanism, nuclear deterrence, and the self-perception and persona of leaders. North Korea is then used as a case study, which pulls together many of the themes of the paper. Leaders ‘invent’ war through linking and de-linking functions, circumstances and ideas, and naming events and concepts, in a way that suits their personal ambitions. Therefore in conclusion, ‘re-linking’ strategies are identified, which can frame the work of civil society organisations and progressive leaders who aim to make war less thinkable. It can provide the means to de-link war from violence.
The term ‘war’ is used broadly throughout this discussion to include organised aggression and violence between states or other significant political actors. But there is no assumption that legitimate defense and humanitarian intervention should be precluded, nor that the use of force is morally wrong. Arguably, small-scale conflict acts like intermittent bush-fires or earthquakes,[i] and may prevent total destruction. Large-scale political violence is now wrong through self-interest. We have become too good at war, and it now amounts to potential suicide. Harm caused by war has escalated exponentially, and this is not just because technology has created weapons of mass destruction. The genocide in Rwanda resulted from small handheld weapons, often no more than knives. It was information technologies that permitted aggression to be organised and promoted on a genocidal scale.
Asymmetrical war provides the new dimension. The obvious example seems to
be the US. Decades of war in the form of aggressive foreign policy has become
suicidal because those who see themselves as victims, rightly or wrongly,[ii]
can now find novel ways of employing technology to retaliate.[iii]
Retaliation is equally suicidal. No expense will be spared to eliminate the
apparent aggressors – and anyone else who happens to be in the way. Any act of
political violence now has the potential for self-destruction, and that is a
form of madness which rational self-interested people will seek to prevent. In
the future, the main weapon of mass destruction will be the human mind,
particularly the minds of leaders, and that is where prevention must start.
Made in the minds of ‘men’
The evolutionary/biological drivers
In his book Straw Dogs, philosopher John Gray argues that humans are simply another kind of animal, war is a game, and those who play it greatly enjoy it.[iv] At an interpersonal level, the main drivers of competition and aggression are evolutionary and biological,[v] and include status, possessions, group loyalties and a hunting instinct. These motivations are now not a declared purpose or reason of war, but they remain a means to inspire men to fight. Stephen Pinker shows that one of the goals of tribal raiding was men’s desire to capture women,[vi] and anthropologists point to social benefits such as increasing genetic diversity and exchanging ideas and culture.[vii] Traditional male ‘rights’ over women in warfare are even noted and sanctioned in the Bible.
And the children of Israel took all the women of Midan captives…And Moses said unto them, Have ye saved all the women alive?…kill every woman that hath known a man by lying with him. But all the women children, that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves. (Numbers 31)
Pinker points out that rape remains one of the hidden rewards of war for men. Proposals for an international convention to make political and military leaders responsible if their troops engage in systematic rape, may do more to make war unthinkable than conventions about weapons of mass destruction.
These evolutionary/biological drivers clearly persist in modern humans. But Pinker reminds us that fighting is not rational evolutionary behaviour, if combatants recognise that the likelihood is death or injury. The difficulty is that the recognition of the threat usually comes too late or is masked by technology or tactics by military and political leaders. He also argues that humans engage in organised conflict because of our mental ‘enforcement calculator’ – we can contrive enforcement systems for punishing deserters and cowardice, and for rewarding bravery.
Pinker might have added another of his insights – that evolution has programmed us to dislike being cheated. Getting people to fight often entails deception and violence by leaders against their own group. In evolutionary terms, a leader is an extension of the head of a family – a trusted life-maker and breadwinner. So this form of deception and self-harm raises strong emotions, and is hidden by despots. Making the unseen seen, is a significant strategy for making war unthinkable.
In 1940, anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote a paper called ‘Warfare is only an invention’.[viii] War is learned, she argued. It is a social invention like writing or marriage, and should be viewed as distinct from interpersonal violence and aggression, which have evolutionary/biological roots. At certain times societies believe that their history proposes that war is the right response to a particular set of circumstances. It seems to follow that if we can change that perception of tradition, the likelihood of war would be diminished.
But war is more than an anonymous social invention. It cannot be achieved just by a population working in an unconscious harmony. Societies have to be persuaded to believe that their history proposes that war is a necessary and viable option. This is achieved by powerful individuals who do the ‘inventing’ and utilise the desire and ability of human beings to follow. Social inventions arise through linking (or conflating) to create a concept. Marriage in the West has been invented by religious and political leaders by conflating functions, circumstances and ideas, such as weddings, love, co-habitation, sexual ethics, birth, child-rearing, and family. Yet there are many examples of marriage or its equivalent occurring in other configurations. Like marriage, ‘war’ can be de-linked to change the nature of the concept.
Gray, Pinker and Mead identify the two factors that make war thinkable – the awareness of evolutionary/biological drivers, and the knowledge that these can be harnessed through societal action to achieve mass violence. This is broadly accepted, but writers rarely go further and point out that this would not happen without power elites. It is leaders who can manipulate our primitive instincts to fight, can mask the risks of fighting, and can create enforcement systems. It is leaders who set goals, plan, strategise and arrange for the mass production and accumulation of weapons.
If we are looking for the roots of war – evolutionary or social - the human ability to lead and follow are arguably the most significant reasons. Without those human abilities, aggression would involve little more than punch-ups and skirmishes. In The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Eric Fromm identifies the instinct to follow as crucial. ‘Conformist aggression’, as he terms it, ‘comprises various acts of aggression that are performed not because the aggressor is driven by the desire to destroy, but because he [sic] is told to do so and considers it his duty to obey orders.’ He continues in relation to World War II, ‘The soldier had traditionally been made to feel that to obey his leaders was a moral and religious obligation for the fulfillment of which he should be ready to pay with his life.’ He concludes that ‘major wars in modern times and most wars between the states of antiquity were not caused by dammed-up aggression, but by instrumental aggression of the military and political elites.’ In support he quotes a study by Q. Wright,[ix] which leads him to conclude that the intensity of war ‘is highest among the powerful states with a strong government and lowest among primitive man without permanent chieftainship.’[x] War would be unthinkable if uncritical obedience, unquestioning followers, and abuse of power by leaders became unthinkable.
In the legal arena,
the recognition of the accountability of individual leaders for political
violence stems from precedents from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trails.
These were then affirmed in the Statutes of the Yugoslav and Arusha
Tribunals, and that of the International Criminal Court. This marks a new era in
which powerful people can be held responsible for harm, as individuals.
But the new ethic goes further. It is an era in which leaders are likely
to be seen as more culpable because of
their power, and the breach of trust. And it is now well established that
‘only following orders’ is not a defense.[xi]
The international community seems not yet to realise fully the significance of
this new ethos, and its implications for the accountability of powerful people
in other spheres of life.[xii]
ethic, there is now a broader realisation: contemporary conflicts are not
fundamentally caused by phenomena described in popularist terms such as
‘nationalism’, ‘ethnic hatred’ or a ‘clash of civilisations’. Such
conflicts are constructed and fuelled by powerful people to serve their own
ends. Fromm points out that, ‘when Hitler started his attack against Poland
and, thus, as a consequence triggered the Second World War, popular enthusiasm
for the war was practically nil. The population, in spite of years of heavy
militaristic indoctrination, showed very clearly that they were not eager to
fight this war.’[xiii]
Distinctions such as ‘Serbs’, ‘Muslims’, ‘Croats’ in the Balkans
were not significant until they served a purpose for local despots. The Carnegie
inquiry into the Causes and Conduct of the
Balkan Wars in 1912-13 (note the date) concluded:
The real culprits... are not, we repeat, the Balkan
peoples...The true culprits are those who mislead public opinion and take
advantage of the people’s ignorance to raise disquieting rumours...inciting
their country and consequently other countries into enmity. The real culprits
are those who by interest or inclination, declaring constantly that war is
inevitable, end by making it so, asserting that they are powerless to prevent
it. The real culprits are those who sacrifice the general interest to their own
broadly, Mark Mazower argues,
cleansing’ – whether in the Balkans in 1912-13, in Anatolia in 1921-2 or in
erstwhile Yugoslavia in 1991-5 - was not, then, the spontaneous eruption of
primeval hatreds but the deliberate use of organised violence by paramilitary
squads and army units; it represented the extreme force required by nationalists
to break apart a society which was otherwise capable of ignoring the mundane
fractures of class and ethnicity.’[xv]
of this nature are common. It is curious that, although the implication of
powerful individuals is clear, the word ‘leader’ has not appeared in such
statements until very recently. But then the minds of leaders often control the
discourse of history.
Bill Berkeley’s book, The graves
are not yet full, demonstrates the implication of powerful individuals very
directly in relation to certain African countries.
He concludes: ‘Call it “tribalism”,
call it “nationalism”, call it “fundamentalism” – the role of
political leaders in fomenting civil conflicts has been the paramount civil
rights issue of the post-Cold War era.’[xvi] Similarly,
if less convincingly, Rubin argues that although the US has made significant
contributions to regional stability, ‘Arabs throughout out the Middle East are
constantly told by their leaders that the United States is the party responsible
for Iraq’s problems.’ He
continues, ‘The basic reason for the prevalence of Arab anti-Americanism,
then, is that it has been a useful tool for radical rulers…to build domestic
support and pursue regional goals with no significant cost.’[xvii]
Inventing and linking
invent war by linking and de-linking
functions, circumstances and ideas - and naming the resultant concepts and
events - in ways that make war thinkable to themselves and to followers.
Discourse is central. Currently we are to fear “Islamic terrorists”, yet we
were not told to fear “Christian terrorists” in the form of the IRA. The
perception of whether conflict is between
or within particular social groups is
manipulated. At a global level, it is hard to think of an inter-civilisational
war since the crusades,
yet we are to
believe that a war between civilisations is immanent and needs preventing.[xix]
Arguably the main inter-civilisational ‘clashes’ we witness have been
conceptual, cultural or in the sports arena, not on the battlefield. Whether
wars are between or within defined social groups is not as clear as our leaders would like us to believe. Wars are made
by leaders to justify and further their own ends, and they will construct and
present seeming adversaries in the way that best suits those ends.
A view of 20th century history
that was created without the influence of powerful people,
question the standard perceptions of whether wars are between or within
particular groups. The so-called ‘World Wars’ were primarily between
Europeans. Should we talk of
or the ‘Christian Wars’ or ‘European Wars’? The Cold War was presented
as between two radically different ideologies. Yet, as John Gray points out,
more accurately, it was ‘a family quarrel among Western ideologies,’[xx]
with their conceptual roots in England. Ireland’s quasi-religious and
quasi-political leaders have fomented an ongoing and unfathomable conflict for
centuries, but is it between Catholics and Protestants, or among Christians? Why
was the Balkan conflict ‘between’ Serbs and Muslims, but not another
Beyond Europe, the Iran-Iraqi war can be seen as a war among Moslems, not
between two nations. Even the violence between the Arabs and Jews is, from
another perspective, within a Semitic group, genetically indistinguishable and
with very similar cultural and legal practices – ‘salem’ and ‘shalom’
both mean peace. East Asian people
have been fighting with themselves for a hundred years, yet the East Asian
region is the most homogeneous in the world. Japan’s colonial violence
included seemingly ‘international’ aggression against Korea. But
historically Korean and Japanese people are genetically, linguistically and
culturally linked. The current Japanese Emperor has now even acknowledged the
Korean ancestry of his family. The Korean War might seem to exemplify an
in-group war. But the
forces’ of North and South were constructed by Russia and the US. The war was
started by the Soviet Union[xxi]
and fought between the US and China, supported by other Cold War factions
(including a manipulated UN), and played out on Korean territory at the expense
of Korean people. Currently it is termed an ‘international war’.[xxii]
This may be terminologically correct, but is not a distinction that can be
substantiated on cultural, racial, or arguably even on ‘national’ grounds.
Was the West responsible for constructing the idea of modern war – of
linking war and violence in a way that was not known before. For example, did
the Meiji rulers in Japan learn to become an aggressive expansionist force by
watching the conduct of their Western counterparts? Before this time, conflict
in and around Japan was ritualised in the form of the Samurai, an idea that was
probably imported from Korea (sa ur ae be).
Only 8 per cent of Japanese families were Samurai, and they operated within a
strict code of honour. Commoners were not allowed to carry swords, so violence
was contained within this small military cadre. In 1869, the government
pensioned off the Samurai. Was this to diminish violence, or to create a context
in which a large national, European style army could be created, under the
control of a single leader?
One of the things that unifies an army is attack by an
opposing force. Observers of the confrontation between South Korean students and
the army in the 1980s remark that the adversaries were often college friends,
and at first the soldiers were reluctant to confront the students. When
(apparently) a few students attacked the army, this changed and the soldiers
quickly engaged in a brutal confrontation. But, as may have happened in Korea, a
leader can construct this effect. At the start of World War II, Hitler staged an
attack on a Silesian radio station, using Nazi officers disguised as Polish
soldiers.[xxiii] The burning of the
Reichstag, which was attributed to communists, has come to symbolise the
phenomenon of self-attack by warring leaders. The creation of false fears or
false enemies is related, even if there is no self-harm. Exposing violence and
deception against ones own group, and holding leaders responsible for supposed
‘retaliation’, is an important means to dis-invent war.
As George Orwell
proposed in Nineteen Eighty-Four, it
seems that in certain circumstances political or military leaders need to
construct an ‘enemy’ to create fear and legitimate and further their own
power. In Orwellian tradition, the progeny of the September 11 attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon is a so-called ‘War against Terrorism’.
There can be no dispute that this particular ‘war’ is made entirely by
political leaders. The enemy is an abstract noun, not an identifiable aggressor.
an enemy, there was then need to construct ‘terrorist leaders’. Of the many
candidates, an obscure US-trained opportunist called Osama bin Laden was
identified. Assuming that the videos and tapes are genuine, he quickly rose to
fulfil a role. In return, bin Laden helped to build the image of George Bush as
a seemingly great leader. In November 2002, a videotape apparently from bin
Laden talked of Bush as ‘the Pharoe of the age’.[xxiv]
The phrase will certainly help to demonise Bush in the eyes of Arabs. The name
‘Pharoah’ was applied to the Western-oriented Anwar Sadat by his
killers twenty years ago. But doubtless George Bush would have been grateful for
the vote-winning accolade. The phenomenon is not new. Erich Fromm makes this
point in his description of World War I: ‘The Germans claimed that
were…fighting for freedom by fighting the Csar; their enemies claimed that
they were…fighting for freedom by fighting the Kaiser.’[xxv]
How often has the power of ‘enemy leaders’ been created as much
through the propaganda of adversaries than by their own actions? In December, a
senior US army officer told Robert Fisk:
caught a couple of really high-profile, serious al-Qa’ida leaders but they
couldn’t tell us what specific operations were going to take place. They would
know that something big was planned but they would have no idea what it was.[xxvi]
officer did not appear to question whether this level of awareness equated with
men called ‘high-profile’ ‘serious leaders’. Warring leaders need to
construct one another as great ‘men’ – a symbiotic relationship that fuels
war. Paradoxically, they use each other as a ‘resource’ (below, 1.5) – an
entity that supports a leader in much the same way as a political party or
This need to construct enemy leaders probably reflects two obvious
insights by powerful aggressors. First, attacking a ‘terrorist leader’ is
tangible and comprehensible to the public. Attacking amorphous and abstract
‘terrorist cells’ is not. On
its own, for the US
military to drop bombs on UN centres, weddings and other civilian gatherings in
Afghanistan, might have led the American public to question the nature of this
aggression. The US
needed the excuse
of trying to eliminate ‘terrorist leaders’
and a few itinerant clerics elevated to the status of ‘Taliban leaders’.
Local Afghan people would probably say that controlling their feuding warlords
would have been a greater step towards ensuring their security. We all like to
hate powerful people – almost any leader can easily be presented as a natural
enemy of any followers.
Second, if an enemy appears leaderless, it may become very clear to the
public that, while wars are made by leaders, they are fought by their followers.
And it is usually not the leaders who suffer most. In ancient Greece, leaders
who declared war were morally required to lead their troops into battle. Since
then, leaders have cleverly de-linked themselves from the dangers of war. When a
US leader takes off in Air Force I or
hides in a nuclear shelter, because of a threat of attack, this should be
presented to the public as an act of cowardice, not leadership. During World War
II, the British royal family stayed in London and shared the dangers of bombing
with their subjects.
Another trick of warring leaders is to present
disagreements between elites as intrinsically disagreements between the masses.
This is rarely true, and is reflected in the traditions of war. Arthur
Nussbaum concludes of the ‘quasi-international mores’ of China during the
first millennium BC, ‘one
stands out: the people of belligerent rulers definitely did not consider each
other as enemies, and there was no discrimination against the subjects of an
More formally, the principles embodied in the Hague Conventions and the Geveva Convention
affirmed that war should not harm innocent or neutral parties.[xxviii]
ethic can evolve one stage further - as wars are made
by leaders they should therefore be fought between leaders. Disputes between
Korean gangs were traditionally settled through a fistfight between gang
leaders, which avoided large-scale gang warfare.
Leaders present small conflicts as precipitants of a full-scale war, yet this is often untrue. They may act to limit the scale of aggression. Among East African tribes, Colin Turnbull concludes that raiding was often ‘far from being an act of war, the raid acted as a mechanism for peace.’[xxix] A few warriors might die, but that settled things and avoided war for others. Eventually, the scale can become symbolic, and fought between leaders. In Arab countries, family feuds were often fought out for centuries through exchanging poetry between elites. War and violence were completely de-linked.
The central assumptions of this paper are therefore very simple. Wars are not fundamentally between social, groups – nations, religions, tribes, peoples, or civilisations. Wars are constructed and presented in this way by powerful people. Wars are between leaders, real or constructed.
The academic view
The significance of powerful people seems obvious, yet in discussions about war and peace, leadership has received remarkably little analytical attention beyond the vilification of a few infamous individuals. In recognition of this, Gordon Peake asks key questions.[xxx] In conflict situations:
¨ How do particular leaders come to power?
¨ Why do followers support particular types of leadership?
¨ Why and how do leaders maintain ongoing support during conflict?
¨ What are the processes of leadership decision-making?
¨ How can leadership be made more positive?
To these questions might be added, what is in the minds of leaders who instigate and promote conflict – what is their perception of themselves?
The absence of a holistic leadership approach to the analysis of war is evident from the indexes of standard texts on peace and security. Taking one at random, the seven-page index of Beyond Confrontation[xxxi] includes twenty or so immediately recognizable political leaders, power relationships are acknowledged under headings such as ‘power politics’ and ‘authority’, and context in headings such as ‘Vietnam war’ and ‘Yalta Conference’. But there is no entry for ‘leadership’. In Erich Fromm’s comprehensive Anatomy of human destructiveness, the index similarly has no entry for ‘leadership’. The 630 pages of text includes one page on ‘conformist aggression’, and there are a few sentences of elaboration elsewhere. But a whole chapter analyses Hitler psychologically.[xxxii]
Standard analysis may focus on individual personalities, and may go further and assess the power relationships within administrative institutions, such as that of the Nazis. And history is almost obsessive about context and the significance of events such as the assassination of Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo. But rarely does analysis adopt the approach of leadership studies and look at the three aspects holistically – how did particular powerful individuals behave in particular power hierarchies within particular contexts? Leadership studies have the potential to contribute more significantly to the achievement of a world without large-scale war.
¨ the abilities of leaders - their mental and physical powers, including perceptive skills and character.
¨ their resources – reserves that they can control and draw on for leadership support - administrations, political parties, families, networks, relationships with other leaders. (Resources can become negative if they go outside the control of the leader, e.g. a corrupt family member, or rebellious army.)
¨ the context of their leadership - the things they cannot directly control at a particular moment.
The familiar reasons why leaders may opt for war can be linked to these three parameters.
¨ Ability – the ‘minds of leaders’ - their strategic capability, leadership skills, charisma, determination, and knowledge from previous involvement in war.
¨ Resources - their armies, information systems, industrial strength, political parties, power networks, and shared interests with other leaders.
¨ Contexts - public opinion, world trends, natural resources, climate, and economic strength.
The holistic question is how do these together affect how leaders use or abuse their power? The parameters are linked by relationships, including perception and trust. Followers, in the form of civil society, cannot have much direct impact on ‘abilities’ or ‘resources’, but they can create a relational context in which these might change.
Some phenomena can be ‘context’ or ‘resources’, according to circumstances, the media for instance. Some aspects are ‘transferable context’ but some are ‘fixed’. A leader may transfer men from ‘context’ to ‘resources’ by creating military service, but factors such as the weather are non-transferable. Internet is providing another dimension – the possibility for followers to create their own leaderless ‘resources’ to challenge and control traditional leadership. The South Korean elections in December 2002 were significantly influenced by home pages of ‘netizens’, which supported the successful candidate, Roh Moo Hyun, not his pro-US anti-unification opponent Lee Hoi Chang.
One of the main explanations for the demise of aggressive regimes is that their ‘resources’ become stressed and exhausted, and that ‘transferable context’ also becomes stressed or not available. The Soviet Union seems the obvious example. Unplanned, this is also the effect that terrorists are having on the US, where intelligence systems are saturated with information, and the military is too stretched to protect Americans overseas. This proposes a strategy for hastening the decline of a despot. Information overload is the main weapon. A dictator, who must utilise his/her ‘resources’ and ‘transferable context’ for fighting a major information war, will have little capacity left to utilise them for other means of maintaining power. And this is war without violence.
The lack of academic interest in the relationship between leadership and war means a lack of questioning. When leadership is placed as the unit of analysis, there are very obvious examples to consider. Why is it unthinkable that the Dalai Lama would promote war, or advocate suicide bombing? The circumstances of his people are certainly analogous to those of Palestinians. Religious belief cannot be the only answer. A proper observance of Islam would outlaw suicide bombing in Israel because it leads to the death of women and children. Is it because the Dalai Lama perceives himself as a living God? And as a result, his leadership embraces the whole of humanity, so it is unthinkable that he would advocate the killing any human being. War has already been made unthinkable for particular forms of leadership, yet we have not asked why or how.
Unmade in the minds of ‘men’
In a world where conflicts and the threat of mass destruction seem omnipresent, it is hard to remember that we are also in a world where there are significant examples of war having been made unthinkable in the minds of leaders. In which contexts has that been achieved and can the principles be extended?
The first example is perhaps uncomfortable but must be acknowledged – nuclear deterrence. Whether of not the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), makes war more or less thinkable will be probably argued about until the day that the former view is evidenced by a nuclear holocaust. But half a century of the threat of nuclear extinction has passed without it happening. The biographies of those who have had their fingers on the nuclear button disclose very little about how individuals have reconciled their personal conscience with the possibility of having to ‘do their duty’ as public officials, and perhaps exterminate a large sector of humanity. The nearest we seem to get to a clear answer to the question, ‘Would you have pushed the button’, has been, ‘I did not know that I would not.’ [xxxv]
MAD has not made war unthinkable - arguably the reverse in some contexts. It has seemingly made the use of nuclear weapons less thinkable, but that is a unique circumstance from which it is hard to generalise about other contexts that lessen the likelihood of war. But there is one generalisable aspect. So far, MAD has de-linked war and violence.
The concept of de-linking war from violence may become of greater significance in an increasingly technological world. John Gray concludes that beyond ‘the ragged armies of the poor…’, ‘[w]ars are no longer fought by conscript armies but by computers…’[xxxvi] The idea is reflected in the views of Korean politician Lee- Sang-Hee, who argues that conscription is redundant in the context of future technological warfare. Virtual war creates the possibility that, as suggested above (1.4), wars could soon really be fought between leaders, without significant harm to others. And if countries have smaller armies of technical experts, the military are less likely to be used to maintain authoritarian governments through brute force.
Virtual war also raises another possibility, the full inclusion of women in warfare. The argument is not that women are intrinsically against war, nor about equal opportunities. As has been demonstrated in the workplace and parliament, the inclusion of women in male-dominated settings brings new dynamics and new ideas. In the male domain of war, women may well contribute intellectual tools that can help to de-link war from violence. There are already precedents. The use of Japanese soldiers as part of the peacekeeping forces in East Timor is not only significant because this is the first time since World War II that Japanese soldiers have been deployed internationally. It is also significant because many of those soldiers were women.
second context – supra-state regionalisation – demands more detailed
consideration, because the trend is towards creating regional identities. These
aim directly or indirectly to increase security in its broadest sense, and that
concept is replicable in many ways. Since 1945, over a hundred such regional
agreements have been made.[xxxvii]
perhaps forget that the minds of leaders have already made war virtually
unthinkable within formerly warring regions such as a United Kingdom and a
United States of America. Europe is the more familiar example. There are other
less obvious instances, which western minds do not appreciate. These include the
United States of Mexico, the Peoples Republic of China, the former Soviet Union
and Warsaw Pact countries, Nasser’s attempt to create a United Arab Republic,
and the recent African Union. Regions not only foster peace internally. They can
broker peace elsewhere. Currently, the EU is working unobtrusively with North
Although the political impetus to regionalise Europe came directly from
the two world (European) wars, the idea was established much earlier. The
publication of Kant’s Perpetual Peace a
Philosophical Sketch in 1795 is often seen as the origins of a unified
Europe, but arguably the vision of regionalisation can be traced back to the
Renaissance and figures such as Juan Luis Vives and Hugo Grotius. The idea is
also evident in works such as William Penn’s Present
and Future Peace of Europe (1693), and Jeremy Bentham’s Plan
for a Universal and Perpetual Peace (1786-9).[xxxix]
The lesson from history is that an idea must wait for an opportunity
before it can become reality, and that may take a long time. But history also
reminds us of the corollary, that good ideas eventually find their opportunity.
Mike Moore, former Director-General of the WTO, claims of prescient leadership,
‘It is wrong to be right too soon’.[xl]
The idea of making war unthinkable is perhaps an example.
Regions that are not based on geographical adjacency arguably have had a
similar effect to that envisaged for a united Europe – the Commonwealth seems
an example, as do trade blocs such as The Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). It is also
relevant to consider regional international governmental organizations (IGOs)
such as the Arab League. The OECD and IMF have made Japan economically part of
the west, and the possibility of a war between Japan and the West is certainly
now unthinkable. The WTO may have similar effect. That is likely to be an
underlying reason for admitting China and Taiwan within twenty-four hours of one
another, in 2001. With the specific purpose of security, NATO similarly links
two geographically distant regions, which we forget have not historically always
been at peace. If we view that planet also as a region, the League of Nations
and United Nations also become part of the regionalisation and security picture.
The significant point about the modern regions is their federal nature
and plurality of power – no single leader has absolute power. Leaders are part
of a regional leadership; they are not regional leaders. In contrast, the older
regions of China, US, and UK have single overlords. Is it just coincidence that
these older regions seem to display a greater propensity for war the newer ones
with a greater plurality of leadership? The newer regions seem to combine two
ideas – that a common interest makes war less thinkable, and the (supposedly
Confucian) truism that ‘Good fences make good neighbours’.
There is another notable aspect of supra-regions. Political parties less
often feature as an aspect of a regional leadership’s ‘resources’. It is
arguable that political parties do little to benefit the public in a national
setting. They only assist leaders as individuals, and that assistance has often
been in relation to war. Hitler and Mussolini would not have got far without the
Nazi and Fascist parties. Communist leaders are inherently the product of their
political parties. The Catch 22 is that few political leaders will criticize the
idea of political parties. And this denial is compounded through the coincidence
of interest between political leaders throughout the world, even if adversaries.
The party of the opposition can be criticised, but not the concept of parties.
Regions usually de-link leaders from political parties, and that seems to
make war less thinkable.
De-linking politicians from parties can also be achieved through utisling democratic processes. Civil society organisations might adopt a policy of encouraging people to vote for independent candidates. In parallel, there might be a greater exposure of the dynamics that make political parties a historical legacy that is of questionable value to the general populace, and of the circumstances in which parties have clearly been a precipitant of war. This is not such a dramatic idea. The leaders of multi-national companies are not hampered by having to work within political parties, and many of them now run organisations that have a bigger budget than many countries.
The arms trade, international law and technological
vulnerability make modern war intrinsically a regional context for leaders. Many
conflicts have shown how weapons can end up being used against their
manufacturers and their allies. A leader who permits his/her soldiers to rape
women anywhere in the war region, will now be held responsible for that conduct.
If a leader permits his/her army to win by causing major environmental damage to
achieve victory (e.g. by bombing a nuclear power station or chemicals factory),
the job of putting that right may eventually fall to that leader. Environmental
impacts do not respect borders, and so problems may well be own goals or have
global impacts. It is often claimed that modern democracies have avoided war,
but is it that these nations are coincidentally technologically vulnerable, and
have too much to lose? The international context of war entails a
regional/global interest and responsibility, but that is not widely recognised.
regional/global leaders, we need regionally/globally minded leaders.
The planetary region
If the planet were seen as a region, would the development of a pluralist planetary leadership create a world in which war is unthinkable? There are precedents. If we look at leaders within the international organizations, that seems to be true. It is hard to envision Director-Generals such as Gro Harlem Brundtland (WTO), Mary Robinson (UNHCR) or Mike Moore (WTO) as thinking of war is a rational response to any situation, however threatening. Yet these particular international leaders have all been national leaders and, at least technically, that means they would have been prepared to sanction war in their national interests.
But this list is selective. These were all national leaders with a
planetary-regional vision of some sort – leaders who recognised a global or
Brundtland originated the concept of sustainable development in Our
Common Future. Mary Robinson had promoted global human rights for many
years. Mike Moore was dedicated to the idea of free world trade well before he
headed the WTO. It seems that there is more to the personality of leaders who
eschew war than their job title. The key factor is that they have a planetary
vision, and that has arisen because of an interaction between their
‘ability’ and the context in which they found themselves. Brundtland, for
example, was a medial doctor and was strongly influenced by her father who was
an international medic. She then had the chance, as Prime Minister of a
progressive nation, to promote a vision of sustainable development and later at
the WHO, the vision of ‘Healthy people – healthy planet’.[xlii] We need to understand
better the context in which some leaders perceive themselves as part of a global
leadership, even when working at a national level?
One explanation is that some leaders recognise the concept of common threats. International relations classes sometimes engage in counterfactual analysis of the consequences of the threat of invading aliens from another planet. One conclusion is common. National leaders would forget their differences and unify into a planetary leadership, to fight the common foe. The concept of global security - which links environment, development and conflict - tries to build this ethos through presenting the new common ‘threats without enemies’, such as climate change and ozone depletion, in the form of security discourse.[xliii] Current discussions about the Earth being hit by asteroids are in this genre. Even if this threat is remote, the process of addressing it could engender more global forms of leadership.
main progenitor of a planetary region is probably not global politics, but the
increase in population movement throughout the world - greater cosmopolitanism
through international living[xliv]
and transnational communities.[xlv]
The British population comprises 340 spoken languages and 33 national groups of
more than 10,000 people. By 2001, the number of immigrants became more than the
natural growth of the population. The increase in international living may not
guarantee peace, but it constructs a context in which too many people have too
much to lose from war, and leaders are likely to recognise that.
The idea reducing the propensity for war through uniting Europe can be
traced back even earlier than prescient texts, and interestingly to leadership
and elites. Arranged marriages within elite European families were intended to
reduce conflict and increase trade. The marriage between King Henry VIII and
Catherine of Aragon, aimed to link England with Spain and the Hapsburg Empire.
Similar arrangements occurred in other parts of the word, for example in East
Asia, and were accompanied by a near acceptance of mistresses and concubines
signaling that these arranged marriages were for the purpose of international
not human relations. The Jordanian Royal family provides a notable contemporary
example of marriages that, although not arranged, have contributed to
international harmony and regional security.
International marriage is not now just the privilege a few elites, and
this aspect of globalisation clearly reduces the likelihood of popular support
for war. Most countries have a
significant number of nationals with family links in other nations. In Germany
one in six families is transnational. Even in hitherto homogenous Japan, the
proportion of marriages to someone from outside Japan is now one in thirty-five.
Interestingly, international marriage also brings the same benefits to
communities that were achieved through the appropriation of women as a prize of
primitive warfare – genetic diversity and an exchange of ideas and culture
(see above 1.1).
The role of leadership is not now to arrange unpalatable marriages
between themselves, or even to promote international marriage between their
followers. It is to reduce the barriers to international marriage for everyone.
So far they have failed to achieve this, and have actively blocked this simple
and cheap route to enhancing international relations and security. In the UK, a
‘spouse visa’ for legal married immigrants takes up to three years to
obtain. Japan can issue the same visa in three days.
Changing the minds of ‘men’
Regions create ‘contexts’ and ‘resources’ in which war becomes less thinkable. Potentially warring factions are constrained by the institutions, systems, cross-border economic interests, codes and ethos, and cosmopolitan communities. And the reduced influence from political parties removes a major progenitor of war. But might a ‘personal resource’ - the mind of a leader - be changed because of these dynamics? Regionally minded leaders, even if nationally based, seem less inclined to war. The world certainly seemed safer with a globally minded Clinton as President of the US, than with a provincially minded George Bush.
The basic self-perception mechanisms seem simple. If regional leaders proposed war, they would be proposing war against themselves, because they are responsible for a regional interest. War framed in this manner is not a rational act, and leaders do not want to perceive themselves as irrational, so war is avoided. Similarly, the ethic that binds regional leaderships together is about group and territorial unity, and it would be contradictory to create group divisions as is common among leaders who want to create war (1.3). Again, no leader wants to appear self-contradictory.
Self-perception theory supports the idea that contexts are important. D.J. Bem’s original premise is that people come to know their internal states ‘partially by inferring them from observations of their own behaviour and/or the circumstances in which this behaviour occurs.’[xlvi] For example, politicians who observe themselves enthusiastically applauding a particular speech may infer that this is because they agree with that speech and are therefore ideologically a member of that political group. But ‘circumstances’ also play a part. Those who find themselves spontaneously applauding an unknown speaker, will perceive this as greater agreement than if they are routinely applauding a colleague who they know they wish to please. When there are no obvious alternative circumstantial explanations for particular behaviour, self-perception mechanisms will be strongest and will draw conclusions from self-observation. Leaders who observe themselves in the context of a regional leadership seem more likely to perceive themselves as having regional responsibility, and this perception is strong because there are few alternative explanations.
The significance of self-perception theory is that it sets up ‘the conditions for attitude change…if attitudes are determined by behaviour rather than the other way around, then modification of behaviour will produce concomitant modification of attitude.’[xlvii] It seems possible to change the minds of leaders through creating a ‘context’ in which they perceive themselves as having regional responsibility, even if they are not regional leaders. But how can this be done?
In the classical Roman theatre, persona was the mask that an actor wore to express the role being played. Jung then used the term to mean the role a person takes on because of social pressures – a role that society expects someone to play – the public face. Are there social pressures, perhaps brought about by civil society, which can change a leader’s persona, from provincial to regional?
One approach is to return to the significance of ‘relational context’ (1.5), and employ a theoretical framework developed Lee, who proposes that the relations, including perceptions, can be viewed in two categories: ‘Hard’ relations, which are coercive, law-based and rooted in written codes. And ‘soft’ relations which are negotiated, empathy-based and reflect social norms and traditions. The relations of a coercive politician such as Korea’s President Park exemplifies the former, and public empathy with the personal experiences of a leader such as Nelson Mandela reflects the latter.[xlviii] Most leaders are likely to use, and be perceived to use, a mixture of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ – carrot and stick – relations. The effectiveness probably arises because of the link between the two. Like the donkey, followers do not have a clear perception of what is leading them, and so to challenge and refusal becomes less easy. But leaders can also be led by followers, through the effective linking of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ relations.
Precipitating persona changes in relation to ‘hard’ relationships is probably easiest to envisage. These would come about through reference to the frameworks now provided by international law, other codes of conduct, or emergent norms such as the global/planetary interest[xlix] and enforcement institutions such as the Yugoslav and Arusha war tribunals. National courts also have a role. In December 2002, CND started a case in the high court against the UK government on the basis that a war with Iraq would be unlawful without UN consent. This was the first case of its kind.[l] Leaders intrinsically wish to appear strong. So the strategy is to propose the need for strong leadership to uphold a regional interest and international norms. Leaders who follow popularist calls for aggression or act out of self-interest, should be seen as weak.
Although the centrality of leadership to world security is readily accepted, there is no formal international code of conduct regulating global leadership.[li] Formally acknowledging the responsibility of identifiable leaders within codes that restrain aggression and violence, would probably greatly improve their effectiveness.[lii] The Chemical Weapons Convention provides a rare example. This requires registration of the name of the owner of factories that can produce chemicals that could be utilised in weapons.[liii] But the lack of codification of leadership responsibility is perhaps not so surprising. The minds of leaders also control whether or not they regulate themselves.
‘Soft’ change is more subtle, and stems from a psychological truism that we are all ‘a reaction to the reaction to us’. The reaction of others to our persona will create a reaction by us, which then evolves the persona we use in the future.
Simple experiments show that daily interaction is related to our outward appearance. For example, a young attractive woman asking busy bus conductors foolish questions will get helpful accommodating answers. But if the same women is dressed and made-up as an older woman, she acts as if having a mental disability, and she asks the same foolish questions, the response is usually less helpful and sometimes hostile. As a reaction to this, people who actually have this experience may take on the persona of an aggressive individual, and they get caught in a negative ‘persona trap’.
Other lessons about marginalised people can be applied to powerful
leaders. Professionals who work with people with mental disabilities who display
‘challenging behaviour’ (aggression or violence) employ straightforward
psychology. They ignore bad behaviour and reward good, unless there is an
immediate likelihood of harm. To acknowledge bad behaviour, even in the form of
punishment, can become a reward. For people with mental disabilities and
powerful leaders alike, the reward of gaining attention can outweigh the pain of
punishment. Rewards are often symbolic – maybe just simple praise. For
rewards such as Peace Prizes, de-link the evolutionary/biological demand for the
rewards of aggression, from rewards that have real value, such as water and
Punishment is avoided because it will be seen as unjust or irrelevant, and may precipitate aggression. If remedial action is necessary, it is decided outside the heat of an irritating event. If critical comment is necessary, then the rule is ‘condemn the behaviour not the person’. Academics who have studied people responsible for torture point out that men who can order or carry out horrible atrocities, may at home be wonderful, gentle loving husbands and fathers. It is therefore more accurate to talk of, ‘People who torture’ rather than, ‘Torturers’. Condemning the action and not the person leaves the possibility for rehabilitation.
Like marginalised people, marginalised leaders may need facilitation to take part in discussions and negotiations. Facilitation is considered necessary in relation to minority groups, but it is hard to extend this ethos to people who we have been taught to hate. We need to extend contemporary principles of redressing social exclusion to apparent despots. They need to be drawn into the international community, not pushed away. Exclusion, whether in a psychiatric hospital or a palace, is not going to create people who can contribute the building a safer world, because this does not build the empathy necessary for ‘soft’ relations in a large community.
Is it possible to engender regional and global personas
and changes in self-perception through the media? Would a CNN programme that
showed Saddam Hussein positively as part of a global leadership help to change
his perception of himself of lessen the (supposed) threat he poses? Would a
portrayal of Israeli leaders as part of a regional Middle East leadership have a
similar effect? At present, the media usually presents a stereotypical view of
these leaders as isolationist. Other forms of information technology might be
employed. Isolationist leaders could take part in public videoconference
meetings of international leaders - virtual G-meetings.
A carrot-and stick approach links ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ relations. The building of relational contexts that engender a positive persona and self-perception change therefore includes:
¨ International codes and other norms that constrain aggression and violence.
¨ Codes that put specific responsibilities on identifiable leaders.
¨ A public view that strong leaders support these norms, and weak leaders do not.
¨ A realisation that even powerful people become ‘a reaction to the reaction to them.’
¨ A greater responsibility within the international community, and civil society, to break negative ‘persona traps’.
¨ Condemning poor personal conduct, not the person.
¨ Rewarding good conduct, and (if safe to do so) ignoring bad.
¨ Utilising symbolic rewards linked to status.
¨ Facilitating and supporting apparent despots to take part in negotiations.
¨ Presenting excluded provincial leaders in a global or regional context, through the media and IT.
As with good horse-riding, ultimate goal of using a carrot-and-stick approach, is that the stick is effective because it is there, not because it is used. Like the whip of a good horse-rider or the sword of a modern king, enforcement measures should become largely symbolic.
4. Changing minds in Korea
The Korean peninsula provides an instance of an ongoing ‘international war’. North Korean President Kim Jong Il is presented as an international recluse who is a threat to world security. He is also presented as a leader who harms his own people through oppressive social control,[liv] appropriation of resources and consequent mass poverty, and through imprisoning his opposition in labour camps[lv] where pregnant women are forced to have abortions or their infants are killed.[lvi] Such stories are presented by western observers, and usually at times when it thought necessary to construct Kim Jong Il as an enemy leader. Whatever the truth, North Korea seems to show that provincially-minded leaders are more inclined to war, and the peninsular exemplifies other important themes.
Korea demonstrates that paradoxical coincidences of interests between leaders can fuel war. In November 2002, the Herald Tribune reported an exchange of military technology between North Korea and Pakistan. North Korea had allegedly supplied Pakistan with ballistic missile parts, and Pakistan had provided North Korea with machinery to improve its production of highly enriched uranium. The Pakistani plane that took the missile parts from North Korea to Pakistan was a Lockhead-built C-130, made available to Pakistan by the US leadership, in return for Pakistan’s co-operation in the US ‘War against terrorism’.[lvii] A few days later, a ship carrying scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen was intercepted, but it was permitted to continue because the US did not want to upset Yemen when a war with Iraq seemed immanent.[lviii] War is now intrinsically regional/global.
In September 2002, The People’s Korea website provided ‘answers to written questions raised by the president of the Kyodo News Service’, by Kim Jong Il, which included the following statement:
"Korea and Japan are geographically
close countries, and they had maintained relations from olden times exchanging
visits with each other. But in the past century discord and confrontation have
brought the relations between the two countries to an extremely abnormal
state…Normalizing relations between the two countries and developing
good-neighborly relations accords with the aspirations and interests of the
peoples of the two countries…
Korea and Japan are Asian nations. They should live in friendship as
nearest neighbours, not as near yet distant neighbors, and promote coexistence
and co-prosperity. This is our will and consistent standpoint."
The significance is not just about relations with Japan, which is probably due to North Korea’s economic problems. It is that Kim Jong Il chose to adopt a regional argument, yet he seems an unlikely advocate of regional concern. Did the planned meeting with Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi four days later engender in Kim a persona of being a regional leader because he was treated as a regional leader. Did he perceive himself as a regional leader, because he observed himself as part of a regional leadership, as self-perception theory proposes (3.1)?
Whatever the truth, why did the international community not react to this statement? World leaders might have encouraged Kim’s newfound regional concern through promoting Korean unification and encouraging international dialogue. Current international rhetoric is about controlling weapons of mass destruction in the North, not about full reunification of Korea, as in Germany . Why? It is very probable that a unified Korea would quickly become a significant economic rival for Japan, the US, Russia, China and Europe. So there is a disincentive for national leaders outside Korea to encourage full unification, but also within the peninsula, because this would reduce the power of most Korean leaders. This dynamic was demonstrated by the campaign by the South Korean opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP), against the unification minister Lim Dong-Won, in 2001. The GNP accused Lim of a technical breach of the law, which prohibits praising the North. Constructive dialogue is hard if the Minister cannot display a few courtesies towards the North. The persona of an aggressive leader is being constructed, and war fuelled, through coincidences of leadership interests, internal and external.
Acceptance that Korea may not be fully unified may seem strange to
outsiders. But this policy may create another pluralist region, not much
different from the United Kingdom, and only differing from the EU in scale and
complexity. Historically, Korea was three nations from 4th to 7th
century, and two from 698-926AD. Perhaps ultimately a regional pluralist Korean leadership will bring
greater stability than would a fully unified Korea.
Since July 1953, the Korean war has been a war without significant
violence. Has South Korea’s lead in economic and technological development
extended, unnoticed, to demonstrating a lead in how we unthink war, through
de-linking war and violence? The
demise of oppressive leadership in the North is likely to come about because the
‘resources’ of the regime become exhausted and the world ‘context’ no
longer provides the needed ‘transferable resources’ (1.5). The international
community could probably hasten this process, if it wanted to.
At the Asian games
in Busan in September 2002, athletes from North and South Korea entered the
stadium holding hands. They also carried a flag showing the whole Korean
peninsula as blue, as did the teams at the Inter-Korean football match.[lx]
It is unlikely that this would have happened without agreement from power elites
in North and South. Create the right context and leaders recognise that the
evolutionary/biological drivers of war can be de-linked from war, and they even
use the context to promote peace. In sports, the competing is real but the prize
is symbolic – a medal. Leaders attending the games observed themselves as part
of a regional leadership, and their self-perception may change accordingly.
Accompanying the North Korean athletes were many conspicuously beautiful
young North Korean women. Local men were so impressed that a North Korean
dialect became fashionable in Busan. More surprisingly, the clothes and
hair-styles of the North Korean women reflected current western fashions. Again,
this is likely to have been sanctioned from the highest level. Was this another
signal that Kim Jong Il was starting to think globally? Kim is known to pay
attention to such details. In 1996, he took personal responsibility for
redesigning the uniforms of his own traffic police, who also ‘appear to be
chosen for their beauty’.[lxi]
If intelligence agencies employed more women, perhaps the significance of
such details would be noticed and built upon.
In the right context, the prey of male warfare can become the leaders who
show that evolutionary/biological drivers can operate in different ways.
Historically, if not a prize of war, women have often cheered and
encouraged their men to go and fight. Can they now show second-track global
leadership and support men who want to find alternatives to war? In May 2002, Ms
Park Keun Hye, daughter of the former president Park Chung Hee, went to the
North to meet Kim Jong Il and the National Reconciliation Council.[lxii]
Then in October, women students from North and South gathered at Mt. Kumgang, as
did Korean women overseas, to promote reconciliation and co-operation.[lxiii]
The world media ignored both events. The role of Korean women in peace-making is
not new. In 1919, during Japanese occupation, Yu Gwan Sun was among activists
who organised a peaceful protest in the form of a ‘Declaration of
Independence’ distributed to 35,000 Christian, Buddhist and other Korean
leaders, in three days. She was imprisoned, where she died.
The refusal to give Kim Jong Il the Nobel Peace Prize, when it is was
given to Kim Dae Jung following the historic handshake between the two Kims, is
a major failure of the international community. It would have rewarded good
behaviour while ignoring bad, and engendered ‘soft’ empathy, but in relation
to ‘hard’ traditional norms of the prize. It would have helped to build Kim
Jong Il’s international persona,
probably evolved his self-perception and reversed his provincialism and
international exclusion. It might have started to de-link him from his Korean People’s Party. His status would have been enhanced, and he
would have captured a major symbolic possession, with no violence. All this for
the cost of a medal. There is more
to be gained from using a Peace Prize to reward the good behavior of a ‘bad
leader’, than from giving it to a Saint.
Conclusion: re-linking the minds of ‘men’
Leaders invent war by linking and de-linking functions, circumstances and ideas - and naming events and concepts - to suit their own purposes. So re-linking – alternative linking and de-linking - may help to make war less thinkable. A framework can be constructed in relation to the three parameters of leadership (Figure 1). Linking and de-linking are a matter of degree, and do not imply total unity or separation. Many of the strategies are, of course, not new. But it is the possibility of a holistic approach, within civil society and its ‘netizens’, which presents the likelihood of greater efficacy.
This re-linking builds a bigger idea – de-linking war from violence. The phrase appears an oxymoron, yet history provides many examples. Put another way, ‘wars’ involve force but need not use violence. Gandhi, like Yu Gwan Sun, used non-violent force, and his ‘war’ tactics avoided directly attacking the British army. The British forces did not build group solidarity in the way that armies usually do because of attack. Perhaps British leaders eventually sensed this, and so sought a resolution. Contrast this with armies that have presented themselves as invincible and willing to use any degree of violence to win – the Japanese in World War II, and Hitler against the Russians. The result was eventual defeat. The lesson from history, which seems to have been well-disguised for too long, is that one way to win a war is by not using violence. This is especially relevant to modern asymmetrical war, which cannot be won by force, only by removing the motivation of the aggressors. In future war, the leader who avoids harming the opposing force is more likely to win, and the tools of information and computing technology make this more thinkable.
War is made by leaders, but so is peace and security, and many other ‘goods’ of life. Without leaders we would not have war, but without leaders we would probably still exist in the primitive context of petty feuding for the purpose of men obtaining women and other instinct-based rewards. Historically, it is progressive leaders - intellectual, religious, political – who have shown us that this is an undesirable state, and have created the social systems to bring about change. It is leaders who can make war unthinkable by de-linking war from violence. The message to them is that this is one of two scenarios in which war becomes unthinkable. The other is a world in which no-one follows leaders. Information technology is making that a possibility, but perhaps that is not a scenario that will lead us to a better world overall.
Dr Christopher Williams
(United Nations University Leadership Academy)
Lee Yun Joo
(University of London – School of Oriental and African Studies)
In Korea, the concepts ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ are understood in terms of
Korean culture, but are expressed in English.
The same phrase is used Korean – chea
zik (whip) – dang gun
Other examples of international conflict, such as Kashmir or Cyprus, are
not framed in terms of a declared war.
[i] Buchanan, Mark (2000) Ubiquity, Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, p190.
[ii] Rubin, Barry (2002) The real roots of Arab anti-Americanism, in Foreign Affairs, November/December, pp73-85.
[iii] Mackenzie, D. & le Page, M. (2002) ‘Act now’ plea on bioterror threat, New Scientist, 28 September, p4.
[iv] Gray, John (2002) Straw dogs: thoughts on humans and other animals, Granta books: London, p182.
[v] Fromm, Erich (1973) The anatomy of human destructiveness, Penguin: London.
[vi] Pinker, Steven (1997) How the mind works, Allen Lane: London, 509.
[vii] Turnbull, Colin M. (1976) Man in Africa, Penguin: Harmondsworth, p83.
[viii] Mead, M. (1940) Warfare in only an invention – not a biological necessity, in Asia, 40, no 8 pp 402-5.
[ix] Wright, Q. (1965) A study of war, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
[x] Fromm, Erich (1973) The anatomy of human destructiveness, Penguin: London,
pp279, 289, 290.
[xi] Williams, Christopher (2001) Leaders of integrity: ethics and a code for global leadership, United Nations University Leadership Academy: Amman, p72.
[xii] Williams, Christopher (2001) Leaders of integrity: ethics and a code for global leadership, United Nations University Leadership Academy: Amman, pp65-74.
[xiii] Fromm, Erich (1973) The anatomy of human destructiveness, Penguin: London, p288.
[xiv] Thompson, Mark (2000) Forging war: the media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina, University of Luton Press: Luton, pv.
[xv] Mazower, Mark (2000) The Balkans, Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, p129.
[xvi] Berkeley, Bill (2001) The graves are not yet full: race, tribe, and power in the heart of Africa. Basic Books: New York, p14.
[xvii] Rubin, Barry (2002) The real roots of Arab anti-Americanism, in Foreign Affairs, November/December, pp79,80.
[xviii] Berkeley, Bill (2001) The graves are not yet full: race, tribe, and power in the heart of Africa, Basic Books: New York, p120.
[xix] Herzog, Roman (1999) Preventing the clash of civilizations: a peace strategy for the twenty-first century, St Martins Press: New York.
[xx] Gray, John (2002) Straw dogs: thought on humans and other animals, Granta books: London, p181.
[xxi] See: Zubok, Vladislav M. (2002) CPSU Plenums, leadership struggles, and Soviet Cold War politics, (Cold War International History Project) Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, CWIHP Document.
[xxii] Norton-Taylor, Richard & Bowcott, Owen (1999) Deadly cost of the new warfare, in The Guardian, October 22, p3.
[xxiii] Fromm, Erich (1973) The anatomy of human destructiveness, Penguin: London, p288.
[xxiv] Fisk, Robert (2002) He is alive… The Independent, 14 November, p3.
[xxv] Fromm, Erich (1973) The anatomy of human destructiveness, Penguin: London, p286.
[xxvi] Fisk, Robert (2002) With runners and whispers, al-Qa’ida outfoxes US forces, The Independent, 6 December, p15.
[xxvii] Nussbaum, A. (1962) A concise history of the law of nations, Macmillan:New York, p4.
[xxviii] Morgenthau, Hans J. (1963) Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace. Alfred A Knopf: New York.
[xxix] Turnbull, Colin M. (1976) Man in Africa, Penguin: Harmondsworth, p82, 31.
[xxx] Peake, Gordon War Lords and Peace Lords: political leadership in conflicted societies, www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/home/research/pngoing/wlpl.html
[xxxi] Vasquez, John A. et al (eds.) 1995 Beyond confrontation: learning conflict resolution in the Post-Cold War era, Univ. of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor
[xxxii] Fromm, Erich (1973) The anatomy of human destructiveness, Penguin: London.
(2002) Perceptions of leadership and development in South Korea and Egypt,
unpublished PhD thesis in progress, SOAS, University of London, Chapter 3.
[xxxiv] See similar in: Barker, C. & Johnson, A. (2001) Leadership and social movements, Manchester University Press: Manchester.
[xxxv] Answer by the commander of a nuclear submarine, to the author.
[xxxvi] Gray, John (2002) Straw dogs: thoughts on humans and other animals, Granta books: London, p162.
[xxxvii] Scholte, Jan Aart (2001) The globalisation of world politics, in Baylis, J. & Smith, S. (2001) The globalistion of world politics: and introduction to international relations, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p24.
[xxxix] D’Appollonia, Ariane Chebel (2002) European Nationalism and European Union, in Pagden, Anthony The Idea of Europe: from antiquity to the European Union, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp171-190.
[xl] Moore, Mike (1998) A brief history of the future: citizenship of the Millennium, Shoal Bay Press: Christchurch.
[xli] Graham, Kennedy (1999) The planetary interest, UCL Press: London.
[xlii] Graham, K. & Williams, C. (eds.) (2002) Healthy people – healthy planet: an interview with Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General of the WHO, United Nations University Leadership Academy: Amman.
[xliii] Prins, Gwyn (1993) Threats without enemies: facing environmental insecurity, Earthscan: London.
[xliv] Wallace, John A. (1996) The experiment in International Living: a brief history of its international development, 1932-1992. Alan C Hood & Co.: London.
[xlv] Portes, Alejandro (1997) Globalisation from below: the rise of transnational communities, http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/portes.pdf
[xlvi] Bem, D.J. (1972) Self-perception theory, in Berkowitz, L. (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. 6, Academic Press: New York, p5.
[xlvii] Reber, Arthur S. (1995) Dictionary of psychology, Penguin: London, p703.
[xlviii] Lee, Yun-Joo (2002) Perceptions of leadership and development in South Korea and Egypt. Unpublished PhD in progress. University of London, SOAS.
[xlix] Graham, Kennedy (1999) The planetary interest, UCL Press: London.
[l] Pallister, D. (2002) CND asks court to tie attack to new UN resolution, The Guardian, 10 December, p13.
[li] Williams, Chris (2002) Leaders of integrity: ethics and a code for global leadership, United Nations University Leadership Academy: Amman
[lii] Williams, Christopher (2001) Leaders of integrity: ethics and a code for global leadership, United Nations University Leadership Academy: Amman, pp65-69.
[liii] Chemical Weapons Convention Part vii, 6(a), 7(a), 10(a)
[liv] Oh, Kongdan & Hassig, R.C. (2000) North Korea through the looking glass, Brookings Institute: Washington.
[lv] Larkin, John (2002) North Korea’s secret slave camps are finally exposed to view, The Independent, 6 December, p16.
[lvi] Brooke, James (2002) In prisons, swift death for babies, The Independent, 12 May, p15.
[lvii] Sanger, David E. (2002) Atomic ties link North Korea and Pakistan, in International Herald Tribune, 25 November, p1.
[lviii] Cornwell, Rupert (2002) How a show of force in the war on terror turned into an explosive farce, The Independent, 12 December, p1.
[lxi] Oh, Kongdan & Hassig, R.C. (2000) North Korea through the looking glass, Brookings Institute: Washington, p99.